Legal tradition and quality of institutions: is colonization by french law countries distinctive?
| dc.contributor.author | KIRAT, THIERRY | |
| dc.date | 2017-11-08 | |
| dc.description | Recent literature argues that legal traditions of nations, i.e. their belonging to the world of common law or civil law, are not neutral in terms of economic or institutional performance, especially with regard to key opportunities in developing countries out of poverty. We present the results of an exploratory exploitation of the “institutional profiles database” provided by DGTPE (French Ministry of Economy and Finance) and French Development Agency (survey 2009) supplemented by data on legal origin and other variables from La Porta et al. We highlight specificities of developing countries having inherited the French law (relative to those of English law). A reflection on political power and the state finds a strong contrast between the ideal-typical model of French law and the empirical findings. This contrast is consistent with the notion rather than real state in the former French colonies. | en-US |
| dc.description | La literatura reciente argumenta que la tradición legal de las naciones, por ejemplo aquellas pertenecientes al mundo de la ley común y la ley civil, no son neutrales en términos de desempeño económico o institucional, especialmente en referencia a oportunidades clave para sacar de la pobreza a los países subdesarrollados. Presentamos los resultados de una explotación exploratoria de las “bases de datos de perfiles institucionales” suministrados por la DGTPE (Ministerio Francés de Economía y Finanzas) y de la Agencia Francesa para el Desarrollo (encuesta de 2009) complementada con datos sobre el origen legal y otras variables de La Porta et al. Resaltamos las especificaciones de los países subdesarrollados que heredaron las leyes francesas (relativas a aquellas de las leyes inglesas). Una reflexión sobre el poder político y el Estado encuentra un fuerte contraste entre el modelo típico ideal de la ley francesa y los hallazgos empíricos. Este contraste es consistente con la noción en lugar del estado real de las antiguas colonias francesas. | es-ES |
| dc.description | La littérature récente soutient que les traditions juridiques des nations, telles que leur appartenance au monde du droit civil ou de common law, ne sont pas neutres en termes de performances économiques ou institutionnelles, en particulier en ce qui concerne les principales opportunités dans les pays en développement à sortir de la pauvreté. Nous présentons les résultats d’une exploitation exploratoire de la «base de données des profils institutionnels» fourni par la DGTPE (Ministère français de l’Economie et des Finances) et l’Agence française de développement (enquête 2009) et des données sur l’origine légale et d’autres variables de La Porta et al. Nous mettons en évidence les spécificités des pays en développement ayant hérité de la loi française (par rapport à celles du droit anglais). Une réflexion sur le pouvoir politique et l’Etat trouve un fort contraste entre le modèle idéal-typique de la loi française et les résultats empiriques. Ce contraste est conforme à l’état réel de la notion plutôt que dans les anciennes colonies françaises. | fr-CA |
| dc.description | A literatura recente argumenta que a tradição legal das naciones, por exemplo aquelas pertencentes ao mundo da lei comum e a lei civil, não são neutras em termos de desempenho econômico ou institucional, especialmente em referência a oportunidades chave para tirar da pobreza os países subdesenvolvidos. Apresentamos os resultados de uma esplosão exploratória das “bases de datos de perfis institucionais” fornecidos pela DGTPE (Ministério Francês de Economia e Finanças) e da Agência Francesa para el Desenvolvimento (pesquisa de 2009) complementada com dados sobre a origen legal e outras variáveis de La Porta et al. Ressaltamos as especificações dos países subdesenvolvidos que herdaram as leis francesas (relativas a aquelas das leis inglesas). Uma reflexão sobre o poder político e o Estado encontra um forte contraste entre o modelo típico ideal da lei francesa e as evidências empíricas. Este contraste é consistente com a noção em lugar do estado real das antigas colônias francesas. | pt-BR |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier | https://revistas.unilibre.edu.co/index.php/criteriolibre/article/view/1118 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.18041/1900-0642/criteriolibre.2013v11n18.1118 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10901/13887 | |
| dc.language | spa | |
| dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
| dc.publisher | Universidad Libre | es-ES |
| dc.relation | https://revistas.unilibre.edu.co/index.php/criteriolibre/article/view/1118/858 | |
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| dc.relation.ispartofjournal | Revistas - Ciencias Económicas, Administrativas y Contables | spa |
| dc.rights.license | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ | * |
| dc.source | Criterio Libre; Vol. 11 Núm. 18 (2013): Revista Criterio Libre No. 18; 25-54 | es-ES |
| dc.source | 2323-0886 | |
| dc.source | 1900-0642 | |
| dc.source | 10.18041/1900-0642/criteriolibre.v11i18 | |
| dc.subject.proposal | tradiciones legales | es-ES |
| dc.subject.proposal | desarrollo | es-ES |
| dc.subject.proposal | colonización | es-ES |
| dc.title | Legal tradition and quality of institutions: is colonization by french law countries distinctive? | en-US |
| dc.title | La tradición legal y la calidad de las instituciones: ¿es característica la colonización por los países con leyes francesas? | es-ES |
| dc.title | La tradition juridique et la qualité des institutions: est-ce distinctive la colonisation par les pays de loi français? | fr-CA |
| dc.title | A tradição legal e a qualidade das instituiçõs: é característica da colonização pelos países com leis francesas? | pt-BR |
| dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |
| dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |
| dc.type.local | Artículo Revisado por Pares Académicos | es-ES |